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Abstract 
Caleb Thomas Ritter: The Europeanization of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
The main forces shaping Bosnian domestic politics today are the Office of High 
Representative (OHR), the national level political parties, the sub-national actors, and the 
Bosnian people themselves.  The question this thesis seeks to answer is where, to what extent 
and why has Europeanization succeeded or failed on Bosnia’s path towards EU membership?  
To do this we will evaluate the influence Europeanization has had on the domestic decision 
making process and the institutional structures within the four levels of governance 
mentioned above.  The following examination of the domestic actors in Bosnia through the 
lens of Europeanization is done in an attempt to highlight the success and failures of each 
individual group. I argue that two of these main actors, the Office of High Representative and 
the nationalistic political parties, have stifled the process of Europeanization.  However, 
progress has been made by the sub-national actors in initiating the process of 
Europeanization and that the conditions exist in which a positive discourse could have a 
substantial impact influencing the citizens of Bosnia.   
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Introduction 
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is quite a precarious one.  The 
country lies in the heart of the war-torn Balkans and even today, its ethnically divided 
population is a reminder of the atrocities of the past.  Though the war in Bosnia and the siege 
of Sarajevo ended over 12 years ago, the country is still struggling to form a new identity, a 
European identity, and progress toward eventual EU membership has been slow.  Ethnic 
tension runs high in certain areas of the country and the main political parties are still very 
nationalistic in nature.  Ethnic politics and corruption gridlocks the democratic process and 
hamstrings Bosnia from making the kind of reforms that the EU and other international 
organization so badly desire to see.  The main political parties representing the three ethnic 
groups in BiH are reluctant to let go of the status quo because the political elite benefit, in 
both power and influence, by keeping the country ethnically divided, to the detriment of the 
citizens they represent.  In many respects, it is still the International Community (IC) that 
effectively governs the country.  Fearing that the political situation will slip back towards an 
aggressive confrontation, control of the country has yet to be restored to the Bosnian people.   
The main forces shaping Bosnian domestic politics today are the Office of High 
Representative (OHR), the national level political parties, the sub-national actors, and the 
Bosnian people themselves.  The question this thesis seeks to answer is where, to what extent 
and why has Europeanization succeeded or failed on Bosnia’s path towards EU membership?  
To do this we will evaluate the influence Europeanization has had on the domestic decision 
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making process and the institutional structures within the four levels of governance 
mentioned above.  All have had an impact on the current state of Bosnia; however they 
sometimes pull the country in opposite directions.  While they all understand that 
membership in the European Union is the only viable future for Bosnia, their efforts are not 
coordinated and their objectives are not always aligned.  Though some positive results have 
been achieved and Bosnia is clearly closer to EU membership today than in the past, the 
decisions taken by all parties on this journey have resulted in negative consequences as well. 
The following examination of the domestic actors in Bosnia through the lens of 
Europeanization is done in an attempt to highlight the success and failures of each individual 
group.  In addition, we look to determine where the goals of each group overlaps and perhaps 
shed light on how Bosnia and Herzegovina can construct a new way forward.  I argue that 
two of these main actors, the Office of High Representative and the nationalistic political 
parties, have stifled the process of Europeanization.  However, progress has been made by 
the sub-national actors in initiating the process of Europeanization and that the conditions 
exist in which a positive discourse could have a substantial impact influencing the citizens of 
Bosnia.   
The EU and other European actors have been intimately involved in running the 
country of Bosnia for over 12 years now.  Yet, after over a decade of direct involvement in 
the democracy building process, more so than in any other European country, Bosnia is still 
considered to be near the bottom of the list of potential Member States. There are signs that 
Europeanization has taken hold in Bosnia, though one would expect a more substantial 
impact after so many years of EU influence. The evidence to follow will support several 
reasons for this.   First, the Office of High Representative has failed to create a positive 
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discourse in the country regarding Europe and governance reform has not taken place 
because of the extensive use of the HR’s power.  Instead the OHR has become viewed by 
Bosnians as a foe, rather than an ally on the path towards Europe and future prosperity.  
Secondly, the national parties, primarily those of the Serbs and Croats, resist institutional 
change.  Instead they have invoked a discourse calling for what amounts to the dissolution of 
Bosnia.  The national parties have emerged as the most obstructive forces to a Europeanized 
Bosnia.  It is their actions and inactions that have forced the OHR to wield its authority in the 
manner that it has.  Still, hope exists that the Europeanization process can succeed in Bosnia.  
There are signs that sub-national actors are susceptible to adopting a manner of governance 
very much in line with the EU’s views of democracy.  These actors not only desire to see 
changes made in governance, institutional structures and the discourse of the country, they 
are willing to work for it as well.  Lastly, we will see that the despite the impact that the war 
in Bosnia has had on creating a fractured society, the citizens of Bosnia do believe in an 
identity that goes beyond Bosniak, Serb or Croat.  They understand that this brand of politics 
is futile and do in fact have the ability to move past this debilitating way of thinking. 
The first section of this paper seeks to define Europeanization as well as provide 
some theoretical components of the term.  This is done in order to better understand how the 
impact of Europeanization can be recognized.  In addition, given that Bosnia in not a current 
member state, a comparison of the Europeanization process in member states versus 
candidate countries will be presented to distinguish between the relationships the EU has 
with each type of country.  The second section will deal with the history of Bosnia since the 
fall of communism in 1989 followed by an account of the EU’s relationship with Bosnia.  
The final section will present the argument regarding the Europeanization process in Bosnia 
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by examining the Office of High Representative, the national political parties, the sub-
national actors and citizens of Bosnia. 
  
Europeanization 
 
Defining Europeanization 
Any country attempting to join the EU will undoubtedly face pressure to 
fundamentally change the manner in which they govern their country as well as the laws that 
govern many aspects of the economy and the polity.  Europeanization has become the 
popular catch phrase to explain the transitions taking place within countries all over Europe.  
One must be careful though when using Europeanization as a research method.  If used to 
loosely it can become difficult to determine what exactly Europeanization is.  Radaelli terms 
this as conceptual stretching.  It is therefore important to distinguish between what 
Europeanization is and is not.  Though it is closely associated, Europeanization is not 
European integration, convergence, or harmonization (Radaelli, 2000).  It is not exactly a 
model to be followed nor can it yet be called a theory; however it does build upon theoretical 
assumptions.   Europeanization is more than just a simple term; it implies a process that 
initiates political and structural change in member states and non member states alike.   What 
differentiates it from classical integration theories is that the focus of Europeanization is not 
its influence on the European political arena but rather its affect on the domestic level 
institutions and governance structures.  Graziano gives us a broad, background definition of 
Europeanization.  He defines Europeanization as “the domestic adaptation to European 
regional integration”.    He also lays out several important factors to be taken into 
consideration when using Europeanization as a research method.  He notes that 
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Europeanization is not just a top-down information transfer.  The main focus is on domestic 
change, and domestic change can be influenced by many other factors other than the EU.  
The effect of EU directives and legislation, once transposed into the domestic system, can 
then create what Graziano describes as horizontal effects.  These are indirect influences 
created by the interaction of domestic actors upon each other as they adapt to European 
regional integration pressures. Furthermore, he points out that the impact of Europeanization 
is not limited to just the policy realm, but can impact all aspects of domestic society 
including discourse and identities.  Lastly, Europeanization is not just a process that affects 
EU member states; the scope of Europeanization studies includes the impact it has on 
countries outside the European Union (Graziano, 2006). 
 To take Graziano’s groundwork a step further, we can look at Radaelli’s definition of 
Europeanization as it more accurately captures the depth of the process.  Radaelli’s defines 
Europeanization as   
“the process of  a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) 
discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004). 
Within this definition we can see that Europeanization is the process by which EU 
institutions and ideas are transferred to domestic actors at all levels of governance, at which 
point they decide for themselves what they are going to do with it.  It is the domestic actors 
who make the final call, they determine how to react to the pressures and use the information 
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they are given.  Thus, Europeanization will never look the same in any two given countries 
and there is no guarantee that the any country will adapt to EU measures in the manner that 
Brussels originally envisioned.    
 
 
Where to look for Europeanization 
We now have a working definition as to what Europeanization is, but before 
evaluating to what extent this process has taken hold in Bosnia, we must also determine 
where within the domestic setting we can observe changes due to Europeanization.   In 
addition, because our country of interest is Bosnia, there needs to be clarification between the 
Europeanization of an EU member state and the Europeanization of a non-member state.  
The process may still be the same, but the results will vary depending on the countries 
relationship to the EU.   Consequently, it is important to make these further distinctions when 
evaluating the Europeanization process on a country.  One can not simply compare Poland to 
Germany or Bosnia to Romania in hopes that one country will mirror the other and then 
determine whether or not Europeanization was successful.  It doesn’t work like that.  There is 
no one EU member state that represents the whole of Europe.  Every country is unique and 
every country institutes the directives from Brussels in their own manner.  That is one of the 
beauties of the European Union.  It is not attempting to create a union of cookie cutter 
countries.  Each one reflects its distinct characteristics.  However, each country must still 
show the capability to incorporate into the law the EU’s acquis communautaire by creating 
and reforming the institutions needed to do so.  In addition, new member states must meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria demonstrating the stability of their institutions to ensure democracy, the 
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rule of law and meet their responsibilities to other member states in creating an environment 
in which political, economic and monetary union can exist (European Commission, 2008).  
So, while all countries, both member states and candidate countries, must institute the same 
requirements and abide by the same directives, the final outcome of the process is not going 
to look the same and will therefore not be the indicator of the level of Europeanization.  
Instead, to determine where and to what extent Europeanization is taking place, we will 
examine the change, or lack of change, taking place in three specific domains.  These 
domains are that of governance, institutional structures, and discourse (Radaelli, 2004).   
 The first area that we can look for changes due to Europeanization is in the 
governance structures in EU member states and candidate countries.  While the term 
government includes the public officials elected by the state and the state owned institutions, 
the term governance implies a much wider circle of participants.  The governance of a 
country in today’s world can not be done solely by the government.   The EU’s view of 
governance is that many other actors need to be included to reach the best outcome.  These 
actors include markets, private businesses, NGO’s, public watchdogs, private citizens, 
community organizations as well as local and national governments.  Together, all these 
actors need to coordinate their efforts, provide each other with information and work towards 
common goals with all their interests taken into consideration.  While this type of 
cooperation may be the ideal way to govern, it is by no means an easy feat to accomplish.  It 
is in this exact area where Europeanization comes into play.  Well before the EU, all these 
institutions, levels of government and private actors existed, however, there was not always a 
driving force compelling them to work so closely together.   Europeanization is the response 
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by these actors to adapt to EU policies in order to gain access to EU funds and economic 
opportunities (Paraskevopoulos, 2006). 
Perhaps the biggest incentive the EU has to offer is money.  Structural Funds are 
made available to help countries and regions improve their infrastructure and help them cope 
with job losses due to the changing nature of the economy.  However, in order to receive 
these funds, the EU desires that a system of multi-level governance is in place.  The 
reasoning behind this requirement is that as countries develop an advanced system of multi-
level governance the EU, national, sub national, and local actors will become more familiar 
with each other.  In turn it improves the dissemination of information between all actors at all 
levels.  It is believed that with the involvement of these multiple actors, encompassing the 
views of all aspects of society, the economic efficiency of the region will be improved.  In 
addition, this networking of actors is supposed to improve the nation’s institutional capacity 
(Parson, 2007).   So, one area to examine the impact of Europeanization on a country is by 
looking at the changes within their system of governance. 
A second area in which we can see the forces of Europeanization influencing a 
country is by looking at the institutional changes taking place.  One component which has 
been argued to increase the level of institutional Europeanization within a given country is 
‘goodness of fit’.  Goodness of fit refers to the institutional structure of the country prior to 
its attempts to change in order to meet EU requirements.  The idea is that that some countries 
are in a better position to adapt to EU requirements than others.  Thus, they are a better fit for 
EU policy.  The EU regional policy focuses on regions within a country and in order to 
receive structural funds, they require that local and regional institutions are in place to 
10 
 
develop, manage and implement the proposed projects.  However, in some countries, 
especially eastern European countries and former communist states, there are no regional 
governmental institutions.  Therefore, these countries must create them.  Another factor that 
may make it difficult for some countries to adapt is the amount of veto points in the system.  
A country with many possible veto points may have a more difficult time instituting the 
required changes.  This is because certain actors with veto power who do not believe that the 
changes should be made, or perhaps will lose power because of the changes, will prevent the 
process from moving forward.  So, in countries with many veto points and poor pre-existing 
institutional structure, Europeanization may be more difficult to achieve (Paraskevopoulos, 
2006). 
A third and final area that we can observe the influence of Europeanization is within 
the discourse prevalent in a country.  The discourse is the manner in which different actors, at 
all levels of governance, discuss and view the EU and other European influences.  The 
manner in which the EU carries out its policies and even its overarching vision of Europe can 
influence domestic actors, altering their vision of their countries place within the EU.  A new 
institutional structure will have far more impact if those who design and implement it believe 
in the EU’s logic behind it.  By looking at the discourse coming out of a country or even a 
segment of that country, one can obtain an understanding of their hearts and minds.  Do they 
support the ideas embodied by EU membership or are they rejecting them?  In this manner, 
we can evaluate the level of Europeanization by studying political meaning that groups are 
identifying with the EU project (Radaelli, 2000). 
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Europeanization Compared: Member States vs Candidate Countries 
As noted above though, the influence of Europeanization plays out differently in 
member states and non-member states.  Within all three areas we identified, governance, 
institutional changes and discourse, how far the power of the European Union reaches 
depends largely on its relationship to the individual country.  The EU has several ‘steering 
mechanism’ to influence the process of Europeanization (Bauer, 2007).  Where along this 
spectrum the country in question lies determines both the legal authority possessed by 
Brussels to impose changes as well as the likely desire of the country to engage in changing 
their laws or behaviors.  
In the field of governance, the EU can use compliance pressures to force domestic 
bureaucracies to change their organizational structure, fundamentally altering the manner in 
which both public and private institutions conduct business and impose upon them new 
means of regulation.  The tool of compliance refers to the legally binding rules set forth by 
the European Union which all member states must institute at a domestic level.  These rules 
are not very flexible and are designed to ensure a fair playing field in the European common 
market.  These regulations are often in connection with the protection of workers rights, in 
relation to consumer policies and in setting environmental standards.  The EU can exert 
substantial amounts of pressure using the tool of compliance and can punish non conformity 
with sanctions and fines (Bauer, 2007).  In member states, compliance is a powerful tool as it 
is legally binding.  However, while member states have already agreed to allow the EU to 
regulate certain aspects of their countries, they sometimes drag their feet because changes 
can be costly or just possibly not popular.  As they are already members of the EU, the 
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pressure to immediately conform is always balanced against the domestic political cost of 
making those changes, thus they try to get around things when possible.  Member states can 
use tactics such as bargaining and facilitated coordination to influence the process and 
mitigate the negative consequences they foresee by complying with certain rules.  The 
strength of their position as current member states allows them to maintain their structures of 
governance despite the Europeanization pressures (Radaelli, 2000, 2004).  These options are 
not available to candidate countries. 
In a candidate country such as Bosnia, compliance is much more forceful because non 
compliance could result in the loss of the chance to become a full member.  Candidate 
countries are under more pressure to comply and make the changes required by the EU even 
if they are unpopular measures.  Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU has imposed stricter 
adherence to the letter of the law.  This is part because of enlargement fatigue but also 
because new member states that where allowed to enter without complete compliance, 
stopped implementing reform or even reversed achievements once the EU lost the force of 
conditionality.  Case in point, Poland and Slovakia, once admitted to the EU, began 
backsliding on their commitments to professionalize their civil services (Pridham, 2008). The 
EU has far more leverage and power in relation to a candidate country.  However, once in the 
EU, they sometimes stop implementing the regulations at the same speed and with the same 
enthusiasm.  Romania and Bulgaria both failed to combat corruption and enforce law reforms 
at the EU level of standard but were still both admitted; now the issues continue to linger 
(Bauer, 2007).  As a result of EU’s overestimation of the progress of past candidate 
countries, the standard for new candidate countries like Bosnia has been raised. 
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With regards to institutional change, a second tool the EU can use is competition 
based regulations; obligatory rules related to the common market.  The idea is that the 
incentive to remain competitive in the economic market will override national institutions 
resistance to change.  The economic efficiency of a countries institutions and bureaucracies 
compared to those of other competing countries determines the cost of non compliance.  
Essentially, the EU asks that certain economic related policies be changed in order to create 
more competitiveness or remove barriers to the free functioning of the market.  Though the 
directives are obligatory, the manner in which each country carries them out is left up to each 
country.  Sometimes the EU provides a particular model, sometimes it does not.  In member 
states, the rate at which they adopt the measures and how they carry them out largely 
depends on actors outside of the political sphere.   The economic winners and losers of the 
changes apply political pressure and shape the nature of the institutional and administrative 
changes (Bauer, 2007).  For some countries adopting a European model is easy, as their 
existing structures are very much already in line.  This is an example of the ‘goodness of fit’ 
theory.  However some countries have serious pains in changing their existing structures and 
perhaps resist it all together.  The rate of change will depend on where between these to 
points the country lies (Radaelli, 2000). 
In candidate countries, the motivation to be competitive in the common market is a 
large incentive to make institutional changes.  Most candidate countries are in some manner 
participating in the common market prior to EU membership so they understand the 
importance of being competitive especially considering they are competing against larger 
more advanced European economies.  In addition, economic prosperity is generally a primary 
reason that countries want to join the EU in the first place.  Candidate countries also have 
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another large incentive to make structural changes in the area of competition.  Because they 
know that once they are full member of the EU, they will be eligible for massive amounts of 
EU structural funds, candidate countries want to make sure that they have created the 
required NUTS II territorial statistical units required by the EU to receive funding (Bauer, 
2007).  However, it has also been argued that once candidate countries become member 
states, they will see that older member states have not made all the obligatory institutional 
changes themselves.  They will then try to return to the status quo of the past.  This argument 
does not have much support though, as the alterations to institutions required by the 
Copenhagen Criteria are strictly monitored by the EU during accession and can not easily be 
reversed.  In addition, many new interest groups, NGO’s and sub-national actors acquire new 
economic and political powers due to the alterations and will not easily allow things to 
backslide (Pridham, 2008).  Plus, many of the candidate countries from eastern European 
countries do not have existing institutions at all, so once they create them it is unlikely that 
they will dismantle them.  All these factors combine to produce a strong competitive pressure 
to make any needed institutional adaptations to enjoy the economic opportunities that come 
with the European common market. 
 In regards to evaluating the effects of Europeanization through discourse, the results 
here will also vary depending on whether a country is an existing member or a candidate 
country. To influence the Europeanization of discourse in member states, the tool of 
communication is used.  This is done by bringing national regulatory agencies and 
institutions together at the EU level so that they can share ideas and information about how to 
solve common problems.  The EU hopes that these actors from different nations will come up 
with new and inventive ways to tackle problematic issues.  This EU method is completely 
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voluntary, no countries are required to participate but rather encouraged to learn from one 
country’s experience and adapt the ideas to fit in their own domestic setting.   In member 
states, the effectiveness of the communication method depends on how legitimate the ideas 
are.  If the consortium of actors comes up with a genuinely good idea, then member states 
will be more willing to make institutional changes.  This tool of communication is most 
commonly recognized in the open method of coordination (OMC).   Member states are 
expected to come up with action plans to solve related problems and engage in peer 
monitoring, constantly exchanging ideas and identifying best practices (Bauer, 2007).  By 
analyzing the discourse, we can see if the member states interactions with the EU have 
Europeanized them.  In Greece and Italy, Europe became the path to normalization and 
modernization, and thus helped both countries speed up the process to reform monetary and 
budget policy.  In France however, the failure to create a discourse favorable to economic 
liberalization has led to problems in reforming the welfare system and resulted in protest and 
public discontent (Radaelli, 2000).  Discourse, depending on the manner in which it is 
Europeanized in member states, can make new ways of doing things more acceptable or 
more confrontational.   Discourse can alter the availability of resources and it can influence 
the opinions of all actors involved in the governance structure (Radaelli, 2004). 
 Candidate countries can also to be highly influenced by the discourse originating 
from Brussels.  During the accession process, candidate countries are closely tied into the EU 
network and influenced in many different ways through communication.  When ideas are 
legitimized by a member state it is even more likely that a candidate country will adopt them.  
Another example of using communication to Europeanize candidate countries can be seen in 
the twinning project.  During this process, member states send representatives to candidate 
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countries to help them introduce best practices and learn how to transition the structure of 
their institutions so that they are ready for EU membership (Papadimitriou, 2004).  Though 
none of the suggestions resulting from these relations are mandatory, the pressure on 
candidate countries to adopt these ideas is substantial.   They are still under a microscope to 
prove their worthiness for full membership.  In central and eastern European countries, 
studies have suggested that the Europeanization of discourse does not extend past the elite of 
the countries.  As a result of this failure to achieve a personal level of Europeanization 
translates into a weak process of transforming the system governance.  It can also result in an 
outcome of what could be seen as the opposite of Europeanization, Euroskepticism (Hughes, 
2008).  Discourse thus seems to have mixed results in candidate countries as an effective 
means of Europeanization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Background on Bosnia 
 
Bosnia since 1989 
With this in mind, we will now take on the task of delving into the complex world 
that is Bosnia.  The main forces driving domestic politics and thus responsible for the 
political outcomes are the international community, the national political parties, sub-national 
actors and the citizens of BiH.  Reaching the goal of EU membership depends on how well 
they adapt to the pressures of Europeanization.  Whenever discussing any aspect of Bosnia, 
the influence of the past must always be taken into consideration.  It is unfortunate because 
Bosnia’s past is not a pleasant one.  To some extent, the battle to achieve EU membership 
can be viewed as Bosnia’s tumultuous past vs. a Europeanized future.  The two could not be 
further from each other.  The way forward depends on the political decisions being made at 
all levels of governance.  As we will see, making decisions in Bosnia is extremely 
complicate, and often times decisions that have been criticized for causing further 
complications could have been made no other way due to the nature of the ethnic divides in 
the country.  In a way, taking a step forward to solve one issue in Bosnia can simultaneously 
be seen as taking two steps backwards in solving another.  This is the nature of Bosnia. 
The current situation in Bosnia stems from the civil war that emerged following the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of communism in 1989.  The war saw all three ethnic 
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groups, Serbians, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, fighting one another and attempting to create 
ethnically homogeneous enclaves. However, even before the war broke out, the political 
parties had already begun drawing the ethnic lines that would subsequently divide the nation.  
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist governments of Yugoslavia, the various 
republics of Yugoslavia began holding the first multi-party elections since the 1920’s.  
Bosnia followed suit and in held elections in December of 1990.  Initially, a law banned the 
formation of political parties around ethnic lines, an ideological holdover from Communism.  
The constitutional court overruled the law though and national parties were born in Bosnia 
(Bieber, 2006). 
 The three primary ethnic groups, Bosnian Muslims (henceforth referred to as 
Bosniaks), Serbs, and Croats each formed their own ethno-nationalist political parties.  In 
1991, at the time of the elections, Bosnia was about 45% Bosniak, 35% Serb, and 18% Croat 
(Bose, 2007).   The Boaniaks created the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbs 
formed the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croats established the Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ).  The three parties garnered 75% of the votes to the surprise of almost all 
observers.  The SDS had very close ties to Milosevic’s government in Serbia and the HDZ 
was actually a sister party to Tudjman’s HDZ government in Croatia.  These close ties played 
a large influence in the disintegration of Bosnia.  In June of 1991, Croatia declared 
independence from Yugoslavia.  Croatia’s large ethnic Serb population revolted against the 
Tudjman government and civil war broke out in Croatia, much of it right along the Bosnia 
border.  Serbian insurgents backed by Milosevic’s army, the JNA, eventually declared their 
territory as autonomous and formed the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Bose, 2007).  This was 
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the environment in which Bosnia, geographically between Serbia and Croatia, went forward 
with declaring its independence as well. 
Regarding the matter of Bosnian independence, the SDS was strongly opposed.  The 
HDZ and SDA however, pushed forward.  In reality, the HDZ only wanted to declare 
independence from Yugoslavia so that they could then separate and partition parts of Bosnia 
off to join Croatia.  The issue of independence went to referendum on March 1st, 1992, with 
the SDS boycotting the vote.  Without the Serbs participation, 99% of the voters supported 
independence (Bieber, 2006).  Immediately following the vote, the SDS declared the 
formation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the HDZ began creating 
their one ethnically controlled region in western Bosnia and paid little attention to the central 
government.  When the international community recognized Bosnian independence in April, 
the war began.  The SDS began its siege of Sarajevo, supported by men and arms from the 
JNA.  The Serbian army began its campaign of mass murder and expulsion of Bosniaks and 
Croats from eastern and northwest Bosnia, at one point controlling almost two-thirds of 
Bosnia (Bieber, 2006). 
For a while, the Croatian and Bosniak armies maintained a fragile alliance, but after 
expelling the Serbs from the Mostar region, the Croatian army, spurred on by their ties to 
Tudjman’s regime in Croatia, began their own attempt at cleansing the area of Bosniaks.  In 
May of 1993, war broke out in Mostar turning the city, once a symbol of peace and 
multiculturalism, into a battle field.  The fighting between Croats and Bosniaks continued for 
almost a year until the US finally intervened to negotiate a truce in Washington, DC in early 
1994.  This was also the beginning of international involvement in the war in Bosnia.  The 
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Bosniak and Croat armies began to recapture much of the lands they had lost and in August 
of 1995, NATO warplanes began bombing Serb strongholds at the behest of America.  After 
years of shelling and sniping in Sarajevo and following the massacre of over 7000 Bosniaks 
in Srebrenica by Serb forces, America would no longer stand on the sidelines and engaged to 
bring the war to an end (Bose, 2007).  When the war finally came to a close, somewhere 
between 100,000 to 300,000 Bosnians were dead or missing.  No firm numbers exists, but 
estimates are that around 50% (some 140,000) of the casualties were Bosniak, 35% (around 
97,000) were Serbs, and 10% (about 28,000) were Croats.  Over 1.2 million people where 
forced to flee the country and another 1.1 million were displaced within Bosnia (Bieber, 
2006).  The demographics of the country had also shifted, leaving the country divided into 
three ethnically homogeneous regions.  The Serbs committed the most atrocious acts, 
systematically clearing their territory of non Serbs, mostly Bosniaks, through killings or 
expulsions.  Additionally, the Serbs committed the massacre at Srebrenica and killed 
countless civilians during the siege of Sarajevo. All three groups however, were guilty of 
perpetrating vicious crimes.  Bosniaks tortured and killed hundreds of Serb civilians in prison 
camps in Tarcin and Celebici and Croats imprisoned and tormented both Serbs and Bosniaks 
in detention camps in Dretelji near Mostar (Bose, 2007).    The war may have been ended, 
but the scars and animosity between the three groups was no where near reconciled.  
The war in Bosnia concluded with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on 
December 14th, 1995.  In some respects, the current problems existing in Bosnia stem from 
the framework of this agreement.  In the name of peace and cessation of violence, the Dayton 
Accords created a divided Bosnia.   The Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) divides Bosnia 
into two entities, the Republic Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak-Croat Federation (MCF).   The 
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RS compromises of 49% of the land and is populated almost entirely by Bosnian Serbs.  The 
remaining 51% of the land is controlled by a Bosniak and Croat ethnic population (Bollens, 
2008).   While this arrangement ended the war, it has made progress toward EU membership 
a difficult task.   National parties have formed around these same ethnic lines; they 
maintained separate police forces, had different languages, and for the most part, the two 
entities remained very independent of each other.  The Dayton Accords also set up the 
framework for a national government consisting of a rotating, tri-partite presidency with one 
president coming from each of the three ethnic groups, one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb.  
Each serves as the chairman for 8 months during the two year presidency (Political 
Overview, 2007).   The Dayton Accords also established the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR).  The OHR was created to enforce and implement the agreements 
embodied in the Dayton Accords and to oversee the process of transitioning Bosnia for EU 
membership (Majstorovic, 2007). 
 
 
The EU and Bosnia 
In the case of Bosnia, the EU has classified the country as a potential candidate 
country.  Bosnia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European 
Union on June 16th, 2008.  Implementation of the SAA is the next major step towards EU 
membership.  If BiH successfully adopts the measures required in the SAA, then Bosnia can 
one day open pre-accession negotiations, which would make it an official candidate country.  
It should not be assumed though that because Bosnia singed the SAA that accession 
negotiations are just around the corner.  Bosnia must still meet a number of benchmarks in 
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areas of economic, social, and environmental policies.  However, the EU has been intricately 
involved in almost every political aspect of Bosnia since the signing of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), in 1995.  
Via the Office of High Representation, some would even say that the EU essentially runs 
Bosnia.  Furthermore, the EU has invested substantial amounts of money to the sum of 2.5 
billion euro since 1991 (European Commission, 2008).  The failure of Bosnia to reach the 
status of candidate country and subsequently enter the EU would be an enormous let down to 
the EU and by some standards would be an unacceptable outcome.  There are few other 
countries, if any, that the European Union has as much riding on as Bosnia.  If the nation 
building process that the international community has taken responsibility for in Bosnia were 
to fall apart, the EU would bear the brunt of the blame for such a catastrophe.  Taking this 
into account, for the purpose of examining Europeanization in Bosnia and the use of the tools 
described above, one would expect the pressure to be equal to if not greater than that of a 
candidate country.   
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Bosnia has had a very close 
relationship with Europe.  In December 1995, as part of the Dayton Accords, a NATO led 
military force of 60,000 troops, known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), entered Bosnia 
with a UN mandate to implement peace and ensure compliance with the Dayton agreement 
(Political Overview, 2007).  In addition, the Dayton Accords also established the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) as part of the UN mission.  The IPTF was charged 
with monitoring the police reform process in Bosnia and ensuring that all police officers 
where thoroughly investigated before taking office.  Additionally, they were responsible for 
recruiting minority police officers to create a more multi-ethnic force while at the same time 
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oversee the reduction of the total size of the BiH police forces (Bieber, 2006).  In December 
of 1996, when the UN mandate for IFOR expired, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) carried on 
the UN mission under a new mandate to continue to ensure that violence did not resume and 
to maintain a climate in which peace could prosper (NATO, 2008).   
In addition to the involvement of NATO forces, the Dayton Accords also established 
the Office of High Representative (OHR).  According to article V, Annex 10 of the DPA, the 
OHR had “the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this agreement on the 
civilian implementation of the peace settlement”.  The OHR is headed by the High 
Representative (HR) and supervised by the Peace Implementation Council (Bieber, 2006).  
The High Representative is also known as the EU Special Representative (EUSR).  He in fact 
holds both positions, representing the International Community and the EU in Bosnia at the 
same time.   At some point in time, the Office of High Representative will close but the 
EUSR will stay.  In the last 5 years, the EU has taken on additional roles in Bosnia other than 
the HR.   In January 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) replaced IPTF.  Their 
responsibilities are to continue to monitor, train and inspect the Bosnian police forces, 
helping BiH create and maintain a professional and multi-ethnic police force.  Then in 
December 2004, the EU replaced NATO’s SFOR mission with their own EUFOR of 7,000 
troops.  This number has recently been reduced to 2,500.  They are charged with continuing 
the SFOR mission of preserving an environment suitable for peaceful development and 
making sure compliance with the DPA is continued (Delegation of the European 
Commission, 2008).  As we see, over time, the EU has increased it responsibility, visibility, 
and influence within Bosnia.  It is the EU that now oversees all civil political matters, police 
force reform and peace stabilization in BiH. 
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It has not only been man power that the EU has provided to Bosnia but money as 
well.  From 1991 – 2000, the EU spent over 2 billion Euros in assistance with reconstruction 
and the return of refugees.  Then, from 2001 – 2006, the EU spent another 500 million Euros 
in areas such as infrastructure development, police reform and the reform of public 
administration.  Now that Bosnia has signed the SAA, the EU has allocated another 226 
million Euro over the time period of 2007 – 2009 under the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
funding umbrella.  The EU has also extended favorable trade conditions with Bosnia.  The 
EU has opened its borders to products from Bosnia without Bosnia having to fully open their 
market to the EU.  Currently, Bosnia does over 50% of its trading with EU countries 
(European Commission, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Europeanization of Bosnia 
  
 Despite the heavy involvement of the EU and other European actors in Bosnia, 
the Europeanization process has achieved mixed results.  In this section, I argue that the 
actions taken by the Office of High Representative and nationalistic political parties of 
Bosnia have prevented a top down Europeanization process from effectively taking hold 
in BiH.  Fortunately though, Bosnia’s close relationship to Europe since the end of the 
war has resulted in significant changes by sub-national actors.  In addition, the failures at 
the national level have not gone unnoticed and there is awareness on the part of the 
Bosnia people that attitudes must change.  Both the sub-national actors and the Bosnian 
citizens have shown the capacity to Europeanize, and in some cases, they are actively 
campaigning to change the way things work in Bosnia. 
In the following, I will show that the OHR has done a poor job initiating a 
positive discourse regarding Europe in Bosnia.  Though many of their actions are 
necessary in order for them to carry out their duty of instituting the Dayton Accords, their 
methods have come under much criticism.  While they have used their leverage to force 
compliance, the transitions taking place within institutions and governance structures are 
not being embraced by the national politicians.  The OHR has also failed to garner 
support from the Bosnia citizens.  These failures have enabled nationalistic parties to 
maintain their influence and prevent BiH from moving forward in the true spirit of the 
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Dayton Accords.  While the goal of the Dayton Accords was to create a Europeanized 
Bosnia that would someday join the EU, the nationalistic parties continue to divide the 
country and inflame ethnic tensions.  Despite the stagnation at the top, this section will 
also present evidence that the Europeanization process has begun in Bosnia.  We will see 
that sub-national actors, NGOs, student movements and citizen action groups have 
embraced the ideas that society must come together.  They understand that the 
governance of the country must change and that the institutions must be strengthened to 
protect their better interests.  Furthermore, I will show that the Bosnian people are willing 
to let go of the past, move beyond ethnic politics and forge a new identity compatible 
with a Europeanized Bonsia. 
 
 
The Office of High Representative 
The Office of the High Representative is the most powerful international body in 
Bosnia.  In fact, it holds the power to do almost whatever it wants.  The High 
Representative (HR) that runs the OHR has always been a European diplomat, not a 
Bosnian, and their powers include the ability to discharge politicians from their offices, 
institute laws and have amazing amounts of control considering Bosnia is supposed to be 
sovereign country.    It also adds a very interesting aspect to studying Europeanization in 
Bosnia.  While most countries feel the force of Europeanization coming from an external 
source, in Bosnia, the OHR, though representative of the international community, is very 
much an internal domestic force.  In a way, the OHR is forcing Europeanization upon 
Bosnia and the means to reach the ends have been somewhat controversial.  With so 
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much influence and control, it seriously alters the power balance between Bosnia and 
Europe.  Though the OHR is a level of governance in Bosnia, it does not feel the affects 
of Europeanization; it is the de-facto source of the pressure.  Unlike in other EU – 
candidate country relationships, the Bosnian national parties as well as the Bosnian 
people are not really given much room to decide how they will respond to the 
Europeanization pressures.  The decisions made and dynamics of the process are not 
homegrown.  Instead they are instituted by a foreign power and much criticism has been 
leveled at the OHR for the manner in which it has enacted change (Majstorovic, 2007). 
Though many of the controversial decisions made by the OHR are done out of 
necessity, the High Representative has done a poor job communicating this with the 
Bosnian public.  The nationalistic political parties force the hand of the OHR, but the 
High Representative has does very little to try to connect with the ordinary Bosnian 
citizens, releasing their decisions via the press and often time offer no explanations.   The 
OHR’s use of power is perceived by the Bosnian public in a very negative way.  The 
methods of the OHR have been described as colonial and authoritarian and seem 
contradictory to its goal of establishing democracy in Bosnia (Majstorovic, 2007).  Since 
their inception in 1996, the OHR has imposed over 100 laws and removed from office 
over 180 people.  In June of 2004, the HR Paddy Ashdown removed 70 public officials in 
the RS including the president of the parliament over a period of just a few days (Beirber, 
2006).  When confronted with the fact that what they are doing is not very democratic, 
Carlos Westendorp, the second HR, said to the Wall Street Journal, “Yes, this disregards 
the principles of sovereignty, but so what?  This is not the moment for post-colonial 
sensitivity…The problems of the region will only be solved when we have introduced a 
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general respect for democracy and rule of law” (Majstorovic, 2007).   How are the people 
of BiH to learn to respect democracy when those there to teach them show none for it 
themselves?  In fact, it has been argued that the heavy handed methods of the OHR are 
hurting the process of building a functioning system of governance in Bosnia.   
One of the key tenants of an EU style of governance is that of developing a multi-
level system with power sharing structures.  The idea is that their will be negotiation and 
compromise to find the best solution for all involved.  However, in Bosnia, because the 
OHR will eventually just force the required changes upon the nation without the consent 
of the political parties, the national leaders are effectively relieved of the responsibility to 
reach consensus.  These nationalistic party representatives do not need to compromise 
and can maintain their hard line stances because they know that eventually the HR will 
just institute the laws he wants passed.  They have no political responsibility and the 
result is that the weak institutions of Bosnia are not getting any stronger or independent.  
The need for reform in Bosnia is evident and the actions of the OHR can even be justified 
by the fact that without it little would get done, but at least the politicians would then 
have to be accountable to the Bosnian people for their failures to move the country 
forward.   
A concrete example of the OHR failing to engage in this type of multi-level 
power sharing negotiations can be seen in the example of police reform.  One of the 
conditions to signing the SAA was that Bosnia reform its policing structure.  In 2004, the 
European Commission issued a report on the state of the policing system in BiH.  It gave 
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3 recommendations to bringing the force within line with other European ‘best practices’ 
stating that any of the 3 would be acceptable.  In conclusion the report stated that:  
“All three models feature both advantages and disadvantages.  The evaluation 
and final choice depend on the weight given to the different criteria like top down 
or bottom up, product orientation, integration in local/regional communities, 
rationality, distance to today’s realities, ect.”(ESI, Nov 2007). 
The statement sounds very in line with the ideas of local ownership and participation of 
multiple levels of governance to create a system that best fits Bosnia.  However, 
immediately following the report, HR Paddy Ashdown commissioned a group to draw up 
a centralized, single structured police force under the control of the Council of Ministers.  
There was no debate or involvement of the Bosnian representative.  The leaders in the RS 
and MCF were not asked to give input on what they thought best.  The decision was 
simply handed down and expected to be followed.  The commission composed entirely of 
foreigners eventually came up with a proposal for a centralized police force and the HR 
gave the Bosnian parliament the deadline of Dec. 1st, 2007 to pass it into law.  This whole 
process caused an uproar among Bosnian political leaders.  HR Miroslav Lajcak 
threatened to remove politicians from office and enact the law himself if nothing was 
done.  The Prime Minister of the Republik Srpka protested that the whole process was 
unconstitutional and that it if the Bosnian leaders had no say over what was going on, 
then Serbian officials would begin resign (ESI, Nov 2007).  The next day, the Serbian 
Prime Minister of Bosnia resigned and told reporters: 
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“Bosnia-Herzegovina is absurd.  If the international community always supports 
the high representative and not the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then it 
doesn’t matter if I am the head of that state, or Bart Simpson.” (Bancroft, 2007). 
This whole situation highlights one of the major problems in the Europeanization process 
in Bosnia.  If there is no domestic ownership, then there is no real Europeanization taking 
place.  The OHR cannot always just impose law.  It must relinquish some control to the 
Bosnians, even if that means the process will be slow and cumbersome. 
 The OHR eventually backed down and dropped their demands regarding the 
police force restructuring.  The result was that the Council of Ministers adopted an action 
plan on police reform and the EU changed its position.  They instead backed the idea that 
the Bosnian leadership develop their own solution that was more suitable to their 
situation so long as it still met the best practices laid down in the Commission report of 
2004.  The resolution of this problem also brought to end the heightened tensions and 
fears that a new conflict was about to erupt in Bosnia (Latal, 2007).  This whole situation 
stirred fear in the public that the country would once again breakdown.  This all resulted 
because the OHR would not engage in the very type of multi-level governance that the 
EU itself is a proponent of.  
Despite the criticism, the OHR continues to institute its top-down form of 
Europeanization.  The OHR has placed the idea of being part of Europe on a high 
pedestal, using language to elevate the idea of Europe and suggest that Bosnia is not part 
of it.  In press releases, the OHR uses wording to describe Europe as prosperous, secure, 
the future, or a dream, and associates Bosnia with words such as corrupt, dirt, lost, or 
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suggesting that it will become part of Europe’s abandoned backyard (Majstorovic, 2007).  
This is not the type of discourse that furthers the Europeanization process.   The OHR 
needs to approach the subject with far more tact and sensitivity.  The citizens are BiH are 
in favor of a path toward joining the EU, but treating them with disrespect is not the way 
to win them over.  Attempting to Europeanize Bosnia by suggesting that it must move 
towards this utopian vision is not working.  The OHR also needs to stop publicly blaming 
the citizens of Bosnia for electing nationalist parties into power.  10,000 Bosnian Serbs 
marched in protest over the OHR using threats to make the Bosnian parliament pass the 
OHR’s police reform package.  When the public is demonstrating that they do not like the 
way the OHR is running their country, then it is no surprise that the will vote for the 
people who are standing up to them.  None of this is to say that the OHR is not needed or 
that they haven’t helped the country progress.  However, it does show that perhaps the 
OHR should use more soft power and try harder to bring Bosnians into the political 
process to legitimize their decisions (Bancroft,2007). 
The OHR is in quite a difficult position and this can not be overlooked when 
evaluating the enormous task that they have been given.  Initially, the OHR was intended 
to watch over the process of instituting the Dayton Accords.  The High Representatives 
job was to facilitate cooperation, report back to Europe on progress being made, and to 
help the Bosnian political parties coordinate their efforts between each other and Europe.  
However, the Bosnian political leaders basically ignored the OHR altogether and did 
nothing on their own to institute the agreement they signed in the peace accords.  The 
international community recognized that the limited power of the OHR was not enough 
to complete the task of implementing the Dayton Accords and at the end of 1997, the 
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OHR was given the far reaching powers that they have today (Bieber, 2006).  This 
additional authority has become known as the Bonn powers. 
Without these powers, there is little doubt that Bosnia would have fallen apart 
long ago.  The OHR was charged to rebuild a war torn country, bring democracy to a 
place were it had never previously existed, and bridge ethnic divides that had been 
festering for decades.  Without these powers, corrupt politicians would have destroyed to 
political process in Bosnia, ethnic politics would have prevented anything from ever 
moving forward and Bosnia would be no where near the place it is today.  The overall 
effect of the OHR has certainly been more positive than negative (Bose, 2007).   The 
mandate for the OHR has been extended several times and while Europe has hoped to 
close the office, it has not yet done so.  The situation is Bosnia has not reached a place 
where the EU feels comfortable leaving the Bosnian parties to their own devices.  Some 
argue though, that while perhaps the OHR should stay, the Bonn powers should not.  
While they may have been necessary at one time, the Bonn powers have become a burden 
to the democratic process.  Bosnian politicians do not feel the need to make tough 
decisions or work hard to build political coalitions needed to overcome obstacles because 
the HR will eventually make the decision for them.  It is also felt that the HR is too quick 
to use the power, thinking that by instituting one more law, or removing one last 
politician will finally set Bosnia on the correct path.  In the name of doing good, the over 
use the Bonn powers has also created a dependency upon them (ESI, 2003).  Perhaps the 
time has come for the OHR to simply do the job it was originally intended to do, 
facilitate, coordinate and report. 
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Bosnia is without a doubt, a complex and difficult environment for the OHR to 
carry out its nation building task.  Still, perhaps they have gotten to comfortable using 
their powers to institute change.  The national leaders of Bosnia may be hard to work 
with, but they are still the elected representatives of the people of Bosnian.  If they are the 
people chosen to determine the future of the country, then the OHR needs to accept that 
as a political reality and allow the Bosnians to feel the affects of their decisions or 
inability to reach decisions.  Every country has its own culture and image, their own set 
of values and norms.  Europeanization is not about transforming one country into a 
mirror image of another.   It is a process by which a country transforms its system of 
governance in the manner it chooses to include more actors at all levels of society, from 
national to local (Paraskevopoulos, 2006).  This is not what the OHR is doing.  To solve 
the problems of Bosnia, the OHR needs to be facilitating cooperation and dialogue, and if 
the upper level elites are not receptive to the idea, then the OHR needs to focus efforts on 
lower levels of governance.  It must be kept in mind that Europeanization takes hold in 
every country in a different way.  Which way will work the best depends on the particular 
characteristics of each country.  In some countries, a top-down approach my work, but in 
others, the focus may need to be more of a bottom-up approach.  In order to determine 
which way is best for Bosnia we must take a closer look at other processes taking place 
within BiH at lower levels of society other than the all power international Office of the 
High Representative. 
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The National Parties of Bosnia 
Though Europeanization is defined as a process, that process can not move 
forward without the support and actions of several groups, most notably the national 
parties and the elite within those countries.  In effect, in order for the process of 
Europeanization and the transformation of governance to take place, the actors 
themselves must in a way be Europeanized.  Their thoughts and concerns must be moved 
in the direction of a European frame of mind.  While they certainly must maintain the 
desire to improve conditions in their own country, they must also understand why 
working with the EU to achieve its goals are in line with achieving the goals within their 
respective nations.   A failure by the EU to achieve this personal level of Europeanization 
will in turn translate into a weak process of transforming the system of governance as 
well as a possible outcome of Euroskepticism.   
When looking at the Europeanization of national parties in Bosnia, we once again 
find that there has been little penetration in altering the nature of the parties, their 
structures or their political agendas.   The national level of politics is dominated by 
parties that are nationalistic in nature.  The main parties in Bosnia that continue to win a 
majority of the elections are the SDS, the HDZ, and the SDA.  The SDS is the nationalist 
party in the Republic Srbska.  From the beginning of the creation of Bosnia as an 
independent state, the SDS has advocated more autonomy for the RS, at times calling for 
it to leave BiH altogether and form its own nation.  The discourse coming out of the RS 
has in no way facilitated the Europeanization of Bosnia.  Though they have toned down 
that rhetoric in recent years, they still sometimes use threats to leverage power.  The party 
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has fought against any law that threatens their autonomy and they have done very little to 
help displaced Bosnian Croats and Muslims return to their pre-war homes in the RS 
(Beiber, 2007).   It would be very hard to say that the SDS or other parties in the RS have 
been Europeanized in any way. 
In the Federation, the main parties are the HDZ, the nationalist Bosnian Croat 
party and the SDA, the nationalist Bosniak party.  The HDZ has had a similar agenda to 
that of the SDS in the Republic Srbska.  They argue for more autonomy and they too 
have initiated discourse calling for their own independent region much like the RS.  The 
SDA is a little bit more moderate and of the three parties, they are about the only one that 
has views more closely aligned to those of the EU.  They have called for the dissolution 
of the RS and support more state control.  They would like to see the state institutions 
strengthened.  However, in Bosnia, due to the nature of the countries political design, 
consensus between the three ethnic parties must be reached for most anything to be done. 
Because the HDZ and SDS have been resistant to the forces of Europeanization, little 
progress has been made. 
This stark political divide in the agenda of the three parties sometimes makes it 
difficult for seemingly easy decisions to be made.  In several cases, the deadlock could 
only be broken by the High Representative who finally stepped in and made the decisions 
for them.  The HR Carlos Westendorp intervened and made decisions regarding the 
design of the national flag, what Bosnian passports and currency would look like, as well 
as the design of the license plates.  He has also had to remove politicians from office.  In 
1999, Westendorp removed the Republic Srpska President Nikola Poplasen from office 
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because he wouldn’t appoint a Prime Minister that could form a parliamentary majority 
government.  With such an ethnically divided parliament, no party ever gets enough seats 
to form the government and must form a coalition to rule.  Poplasen refused to appoint a 
moderate who could garner such a coalition and after months of failure, Westendorp 
removed him from office (Political Overview, 2007).   
 While all the parties state that they believe the EU is the future of Bosnia, their 
actions do not reflect their words.  Each party struggles to set aside the past and creates 
barriers to true unification.  Despite the international pressure and the presence of the 
OHR, at the national level, the parties have continued to move in a more hard line 
direction.  The election of 2002 resulted in the nationalist parties winning more seats in 
parliament than ever before.  However, voter turnout in this election was only 55% 
(Political Overview, 2007).  This voter dissatisfaction is reflected in opinion polls that 
show Bosnian voters have little trust in the political parties.  In fact 78 percent of 
Bosnians believe that politicians obstruct the improvement of ethnic relations and 30 
percent of Bosnians reject the established political parties all together (Touquet, 2008).   
 The biggest reform to come out of the national government and could be viewed 
as a step towards the Europeanization of the institutions of Bosnia would be the 2002 
entity constitutional reform.  In 1998, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic brought before 
the Constitutional Court a list of complaints against both the constitutions of the 
Federation and the Republic Srbska.  He stated that it was unconstitutional for the entities 
to not recognize all three ethnic groups as constituent people in both entities guaranteeing 
them equal treatment, protection and representation.   The Constitutional Court agreed 
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and the entity constitutions were required to be changed.  Neither the RS nor the 
Federation parliaments amended their constitutions though, and in 2001, the High 
Representative commissioned two groups in each entity to write new constitutions.  The 
commissions where made up of four members of parliament from each ethnic groups in 
both entities.  Giving credit to the HR, Wolfgang Petritsch did as much as he could to 
produce local ownership of the process.  In February of 2002, for the first time since the 
war had ended, all the main parties, representing all the ethnic groups met to work out a 
compromise on the amendments without international supervision.  Unfortunately, both 
parliaments failed to pass the amendments and HR Petritsch was forced to impose the 
new constitutions into law in both the RS and the Federation.  However, he did give 
credit to the Bosnian politicians for coming to agreements on writing the new 
constitutions stating “This time, the largest part of the job was done by the domestic 
authorities and I congratulate them for that” (Beiber, 2006).  Furthermore, most every 
political party in Bosnia welcomed the changes except for the SDS in the Republic 
Srbska and the HDZ in the Federation.  Because of these constitutional amendments all 
three ethnic groups are now represented as equally as possible in all governmental 
institutions at all levels of government thought the whole of BiH.  
A positive indicator of change is that in the most recent elections gains have been 
made by more moderate parties (see tables 1 &2).  None of the former nationalistic 
parties won a seat in the tri-part presidency, but hopes of an effective ruling class have 
still been unfulfilled.  The last several years have also been mired by scandals.  In 2003, 
the Serb member of the presidency, Mirko Sarovic, resigned from office after being 
implicated in an illegal arms trade deal with Iraq.   Then, in 2005 the OHR led by Paddy 
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Ashdown had to remove the Croat president Dragan Covic because of corruption charges.  
The Office of High Representative was actually suppose to close in 2007, but due to the 
continued inability to the political elites in Bosnia to effectively manage their country, the 
term of the OHR has been extended.  In fact, the World Bank’s governance indicator of 
political stability for Bosnia has gotten progressively worse since 2000 (Political 
Overview, 2007).  Clearly things on the national stage have not reached a level that is on 
par with what is expected of a member state of the EU.  Until these factions realize that 
the only way they are going to move forward is together, then the prospects of self 
governance is unlikely.  Intense nationalistic aspirations within national level politics are 
preventing anyone from making gains and denying the Bosnia people a prosperous future 
they desire and deserve.  After almost 13 years since the war in Bosnia ended, one could 
still argue that it is still being waged by the political parties.   
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Table 1: Results of the Oct. 2006 Presidential Election, top two candidates for each ethnicity 
Candidate  Party  Percentage of Vote  Ethnicity      
       
Haris Silajdzic  SBiH  63%  Bosniak 
Sulejman Tihic  SDA  28%  Bosniak 
Nebojsa Radmanovic   SNSD  53%  Serbian 
Mladen Bosic  SDS  24%  Serbian 
Zeljko Komsic  SDP  40%  Croat 
Ivo Miro Jovic  HDZ     26%  Croat 
       
Source: www.izbori.ba, BiH Central Election Commission Official Website 
 
 
Table 2: Result of the Oct. 2006 Parliamentary Election to the House of Representatives 
Party  Seats  Ethnicity   
SDA  9  Bosniak   
SBiH  8  Bosniak   
SNSD  7  Serbian   
SDP  5  Croat   
SDS  3  Serbian   
HDZ       3  Croat   
Source: CountryWatch.com, Bosnia‐Herzegovina Country Review 2007 
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Sub-National Actors 
Though there has not been much progress to praise on the international and 
national levels, there have been some modest accomplishments coming out of the city of 
Sarajevo.   European influences working at the city and sub national level have made 
some inroads towards bridging ethnic divides.  They have rallied the people of Bosnia 
around the common belief that they need to improve their economic conditions and put 
aside the animosity to focus on goals that achieve mutual benefits.  A key aspect of EU 
regional policy is to incorporate sub-national level actors into the governance process, 
promising local and regional authorities the opportunities to influence the development 
within their regions.  With such dismal failure on the national level, it only makes sense 
that the EU looks elsewhere to achieve cohesion and integration in Bosnia.   In addition, 
as a multicultural and multiethnic enclave, successes within the city of Sarajevo can be 
seen as a model to be used elsewhere.   Sarajevo was once an extremely multiethnic city, 
however, after the war, Sarajevo ended up in the in the Muslim-Croat Federation, just 
west of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).    The city of Sarajevo is now a majority 
Muslim. 
In 2003, the EU assisted in the creation of the Sarajevo Economic Region 
Development Agency (SERDA).   To help integrate the people of Bosnia, the SERDA 
encompasses areas on both sides of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, bringing together for 
the first time parts of the Federation and the Republic Srbska.  It includes 18 
municipalities in the Federation and 13 in the Republic bringing together a population of 
700,000 people and creating the largest economic market in Bosnia.  One very interesting 
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aspects of this union is that while national politicians in the RS have been resistant to 
ideas brought forth from the EU, the local politicians in the eastern Sarajevo urban area 
that is in the RS embraced the SERDA as a mechanism for them to deal with local 
economic and social problems.  With the center of the Bosnian Serbs political base in 
Banja Luka, the SERDA offered local politicians and businessmen opportunities that they 
had never had at their disposal.  Local mayors and entrepreneurs are working together 
and transcending the IEBL (Bollens, 2008).  Hopefully this will begin to erase the line 
and bring a breath of fresh air to the stagnant decision making taking place at the national 
level.  The SERDA has also brought Muslims, Croats and Serbs together in the city of 
Sarajevo.  Furthermore, if the greater Sarajevo economic area can become a conduit to 
the EU, perhaps the Bosnians of all ethnicities that are benefiting from this regional 
development will better grasp the EU project.  In turn, it will provide them a common 
good and a shared experience that will help them foster a new identity and a positive 
discourse as well as be an example to other Bosnians as to what can be achieved if they 
work together instead of pushing each other apart.  
The issue of identity in Bosnia has time and again been seen as an important 
factor in developing a functioning state.  Part of the Europeanization process includes the 
development of healthy working relationships between all actors both socially as well as 
politically.  In Bosnia’s case, the citizens must first begin developing a Bosnian identity 
that transcends ethnicity before they can begin forming an EU related identity.  As we 
move closer to the ground level, away from the national stage, it becomes more evident 
that the traditional national ethnic identities are not all that exist.   The citizens of BiH are 
quite capable of creating alternative identities that cross ethnic lines and understand that 
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there are causes that matter to all Bosnians.  In order to further explore this idea, we can 
look toward non state actors, outside the conventional institutions.  Student led youth 
movements, NGO’s and citizen action groups all exist in Bosnia and fight to changed the 
perception of Bosnia as an country crippled by ethnic tension.  Their voices are a force 
for change, not only attempting to alter the image that outsiders have of Bosnians but also 
encouraging Bosnians to start looking at themselves differently and not get swept up by 
the negative imagines portrayed by their national leaders.   
The first example of one such group is Dosta which means enough.  The goal of 
this citizen action organization is to wake up Bosnian citizens into recognizing that ethnic 
politics is a disastrous policy.  They use non traditional and visible tactics to draw 
awareness to the issues.  Their agenda is less political and more social.  Their battle call 
is for people to wake up, take responsibility for their lives and stop listening to the lies.  
Dosta hopes to inspire people to organize themselves and force the politicians to begin 
listening to the people.   Another group, the Omladinska Informativna Agencija (Youth 
Information Agency) is committed to making sure that the issues of the youth are taken 
into account in politics.   In 2006, they sent to political representatives, 40,000 letters 
from citizens stating that they would not vote for a political party unless it adopted a list 
of 30 institutional changes relating to youth policy.  They were also the organizers of the 
“Shake up the State” campaign to encourage young people to vote (Touquet, 2008).   
Perhaps one of the most influential organizations in Bosnia is Grozd.  It is an 
assembly of around 400 local NGO’s that actively campaign on issues from education to 
agriculture.   They recently put together a series of over 130 public debates all over BiH 
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to find out what common issue where of importance to all citizens.  They then selected 12 
demands and created a petition that 500,000 BiH citizens signed.  This petition was sent 
to the every single Bosnian political party and 36 of them signed statements promising to 
work on them.  Since then, 27 local chapters of Grozd have sprung up across Bosnia and 
now monitor local politicians and hold them accountable for what they are doing.  Even 
more impressive, Grozd has begun exchanging information with similar organizations in 
other Balkan states, furthering the goal of bringing down ethnic barriers, reforming 
institutions and developing an identity based on public good (Touquet, 2008).   
All these organizations prove that ethnic divides can be overcome as people from 
all three groups, Croats, Serbs and Muslims have participated and signed petitions for 
reform.  These groups show that the seeds of change have been planted and that it is not 
only viable but imperative that more is done to foster a national Bosnian identity.  In fact, 
the results of an Oxford Research International study of 3,580 Bosnians shows that the 
citizens of BiH are capable of having multiple identities, just like in other European 
countries.  Only 14% of the respondents said that they only see themselves in the context 
of their ethnic identity, while 80% responded that they see themselves as Bosnians as 
well, accepting a national identity (Touquet, 2008).   The key is to help this trend grow 
and enable it to become more publicly visible and accepted.  Eventually, it is movements 
like these that will free Bosnia from its current chains.   Moreover, the development of 
these groups and organizations as well as their interaction between each other and the 
national level of government are all examples of the Europeanization of the governance 
structure.  The process of vertical and horizontal networking, the building of relations and 
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the incorporation of their ideas and values are all essential to reaching an outcome of an 
efficient system of governance. 
 
 
The Hearts and Minds of the Bosnian People 
With organizations like these achieving respectable levels of success, it can not be 
denied that the healing of the wounds from the tremulous past is possible.  Though the 
agreements that come out of the Dayton Accords created the framework to end the 
violence, the time has come to begin dissolving the line that divided Bosnia and 
reinforced their ethnic differences.  Many agree that the creation of the two entities based 
solely on ethnic composition is one of the biggest obstacles that Bosnia now faces in 
building a united country ready for EU membership.  The creation of the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and the Republic Srpska has made it more difficult for both sides to come to 
terms with the past.  Some have even called for the dissolution of the Federation, 
transforming Bosnia into a three level federal state divided into 12 regions (ESI, 2004).  
The idea is that by erasing the divisive lines, the three parties can overcome their feelings 
of anger and denial.  A series of studies done by the University of Sussex have shed some 
light into this very idea by investigating on what is going on in the minds of Muslim and 
Serbian youths..  
The studies focused on the ability of Bosniaks to forgive the Bosnian Serbs for 
their misdeeds and how guilt and shame in Bosnian Serbs lead to feelings of empathy 
towards Bosniaks.  The participants in the studies were high school age children.  The 
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results of the studies are quite relevant in dealing with the current problems of ethnic 
animosity.  The conductors of the studies agree that the division of Bosnia into the 
Federation and the Republic has made unity difficult but suggest that steps can be taken 
to overcome this.  In the study of Bosniaks, the research concluded that as they had more 
meaningful contact with Serbs, they were much less likely to perceive the entire group in 
a negative light.  It was not the amount of contact that matter but the quality.  As 
Bosniaks and Serbs interacted on a closer level, the Bosniaks were able to differentiate 
between the Serbs that committed the crimes and those that had nothing to do with it.  
The results were that they were able to generate feelings of forgiveness for the entire 
group and become more open to social interaction with Bosnian Serbs (Cehajic, 2008).  
 On the other side of the study, the Bosnian Serbs that felt guilty and ashamed 
about what their group did at Srebrenica experienced feelings of empathy for Bosniaks 
and had a desire to partake in some form of reparations.  It should be noted that this study 
took place shortly after the 10 year anniversary and publicly televised memorial and 
burial ceremony that took place at Srebrenica.  There was also a video released of the 
massacre at Srebrenica.  Both these events helped put to rest some of rhetoric on the 
Serbian side that denied the murders ever happened and brought to the public debate the 
responsibility of the Serbs for this atrocity.   The study concluded that through education 
and interaction, both the Bosniak and Serbian children are much more likely to cope with 
the past and begin forging a new path towards a better relationship (Brown, 2008).  
Forgiveness regarding what occurred and a willingness to seek out that forgiveness are 
essential for Bosnia’s future 
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Another important aspect making the process of Europeanization more achievable 
is that of social capital.  Social capital is best described as the amount of trust built up 
between actors within levels of governance and between levels of governance.  As stated 
earlier, Europeanization is a process in which a transition in governance occurs.  What 
the EU wants to see is more sub-national and regional actors, such as private business or 
local watchdogs, who have typically been left out to the debate, brought into the fold in 
regards to decision making about what needs to be done in the region.  In order to do this 
though, some actors may have to give up or share power with these new players in order 
to achieve a higher level of collective action in a given policy area.  Europeanization aims 
to create strong, interdependent ties between both public and private actors at all levels.  
This requires trust.  In order for the process to work, actors must trust one another to 
share information and resources and feel like they are all working towards a goal that will 
be in all their interests.  If a particular region or country lacks any trust between actors, it 
will be more difficult for Europeanization to take place.  However, in an area or country 
with high levels of social capital and trust, developing these networks will come about 
more easily, in return, allowing the process of Europeanization a better chance of 
succeeding (Paraskevopoulos, 2006).  
Social Capital is a key component in the development of a functional system of 
governance.  Effective governance is of course a major objective of Europeanization.  
Thus, one can say that social capital is also a major factor in the success of 
Europeanization in the Bosnia.  In an article by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, she looks at social 
capital in the Balkans and relates it to the ideas of particularism and universalism.  
Mungiu describes particularism as a mentality prevalent in the Balkan states in which the 
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way a person is treated depends upon the group they belong to.   She contrasts this way of 
thinking to that of universalism, the western model and the design upon which the 
European Union has followed.  Universalism simply means that all individuals are treated 
as equals under the law and by society at large.   
Particularism refers to a system that is based on informal institutions.  These 
informal institutions are tied more into traditional rules, while formal institutions are 
associated with legal legitimacy.  Some believe that informal institutions prevent formal 
institutions from taking root, while others believe that informal institutions work because 
the formal once are weak and ineffective and thus become a parallel system to get things 
done in society.  While this idea somehow suggests that the informal institutions do not 
hamper the growth of a formal system, long term and widespread particularistic behavior 
detracts from the rule of law and prevents modernization and bureaucratization.  In short, 
rule of law and particluarism can not coexist; they are on opposite ends of the spectrum.  
In particularistic societies, people are treated unequally because of their position in 
society and the groups they belong to.  Access to goods and services depends on how 
close you are to individuals in power, not rule of law.  This system in the Balkans is a 
result of Communist era ‘politocracies’ that created special groups to distribute social and 
political power.  The result of this particularistic way of doing things is that there is no 
trust between groups, no shared set of moral values or norms of behavior and thus no 
social capital (Mungiu-Pippidi,2005).  Social capital is the trust between groups and 
people that allows for civic and business relationships to thrive, develop and form close 
associations between and amongst all levels of society.  Without this social trust their can 
be no modernization and the development of the institutions in Bosnia needed to 
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effectively run the country.  Social trust is based on shared positive experiences; it 
dictates behavior and is strengthened by these positive interactions.  There have not been 
enough of these shared positive experiences in Bosnia. 
In Bosnia, there appears to be a serious lack of trust.  Trust has been found to be a 
key component in economic, political and social development.  Trust creates an 
atmosphere where growth can flourish and in general contributes the health of society.  In 
Bosnia, surveys, data and findings seem suggest that trust has declined over the past 10 
years and that ethnicity may be a contributing factor but not the only factor.  In general, 
people in Bosnia do not trust anyone outside of their family.  They do not even trust 
people of the same ethnic group.  However, those who show high levels of trust do trust 
people of their own groups as well as people from other nationalities.  So when people do 
trust, ethnic homogeneity is not an issue.  The data does shows that groups in ethnically 
heterogeneous areas have less trust than groups in homogeneous areas.  So ethnicity does 
appear to play a role in trust, but how much so it not completely clear (Hakansson, 2007).  
What is clear though is that in order to Europeanization to take hold in Bosnia in any 
form at any level something must change.  In order to influence lasting change within the 
institutions and governance of Bosnia as well as in the hearts of the people, trust is going 
to play a big part of it. 
 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to make the lasting reforms needed to meet 
the stringent criteria of the Acquias Communitair, the way forward must be travel as a 
united force.  The international community, the national level leaders, the sub-national 
actors and the citizens of BiH must find a way to create new relationships built on their 
shared desire to improve the lives of all the peoples of Bosnia.  It is my belief that until 
the voices at ever level of governance are brought into the fold, the situation will remain 
stuck in the rut of the past.   By looking at the case of Bosnia from multiple angles, from 
the top down as well as the bottom up, we can see that there is clearly a gap between 
what is going on at the grass root level and what is taking place on the national stage.  
European leaders have in many ways neglected to capitalize on these positive 
developments.  Many view the structure of the Dayton Accords as a significant barrier 
and underlying cause of today’s stalemate between the political parties.  In the quest for a 
Europeanized Bosnia, it is important to focus on each and every level of society in the 
search for the answer.  In order for prosperous and lasting change to take place, the 
influences and the ideas of participants ranging from the High Representative to the 
aspiring youth need to be taken into consideration.   All actors at each level of 
governance have important roles to play in the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
more ties between them and the deeper those relationships become, the better the 
likelihood that the decisions reached will adequately reflect the desires of the people.   
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There is certainly much work to be done and a long way to go before Bosnia will 
be joining the European Union.  Europeanization can take hold in Bosnia though.  There 
are clearly trust issues, a major factor in the development of the type of governance 
structures the EU would like to see, but the elements to change the countries direction do 
exist.  The people of Bosnia may be disheartened but they have not given up.  Europe is 
the only viable future for Bosnia, and while that statement is recognized by all, the fact 
that so little has been accomplished in the last decade is a sign that something is not 
working.  The major roadblock toward progress is clearly the nationalist parties the run 
the country.  However, the only real way to replace them is to better inform the public of 
the problems they are causing and to help foster new parties to replace them.  The Office 
of High Representative must do a better job a facilitating a positive European discourse, 
even if they must continue to use their power to move things forward.  If needed, they 
should appeal more directly to the citizens of Bosnia for help in accomplishing the task of 
transforming the country.  If the national elite can not reach a consensus, then the 
international community needs to put more resources into developing regional 
associations such as the  Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency and help 
support grass root organization and NGO’s that create the type of identity groups that 
transcend ethnicity.  They have shown the capacity to achieve the type of relationships 
that the political elite have so far failed to demonstrate.  The Europeanization of Bosnia is 
not going to come just from the top but rather from the efforts and desires of a new 
generation who have yet to exert the full extent of their influence into the process.  The 
path to Brussels may be a long one but with patients and perseverance it will be reached. 
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